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ABSTRACT
The success of pre-trained word embeddings has motivated its
use in tasks in the biomedical domain. The BERT language model
has shown remarkable results on standard performance metrics
in tasks such as Named Entity Recognition (NER) and Semantic
Textual Similarity (STS), which has brought significant progress
in the field of NLP. However, it is unclear whether these systems
work seemingly well in critical domains, such as legal or medical.
For that reason, in this work, we propose an adversarial evaluation
scheme on two well-known datasets for medical NER and STS. We
propose two types of attacks inspired by natural spelling errors and
typos made by humans. We also propose another type of attack that
uses synonyms of medical terms. Under these adversarial settings,
the accuracy of the models drops significantly, and we quantify
the extent of this performance loss. We also show that we can
significantly improve the robustness of the models by training
them with adversarial examples. We hope our work will motivate
the use of adversarial examples to evaluate and develop models
with increased robustness for medical tasks.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies → Machine learning; • Applied
computing→ Health informatics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Biomedical Natural Language Processing, or also known as BioNLP,
are computational tools and methods for processing textual infor-
mation and generally applied to tasks such as information retrieval,
document classification, or literature-based discovery. Some appli-
cations of these techniques include gen-disease technology [21], the
development of new drugs [24], or automatic screening of biomedi-
cal documents [4].
With the exponential growth of digital biomedical literature, the
application of natural language processing for decision-making is
increasingly necessary. In order to encourage the development of
this area, public datasets and challenges have been shared with the
community to solve these tasks, such as BioSSES [22], HOC [8],
ChemProt [13] and BC5CDR [25].
At the same time, general-purpose neural language models have
recently shown significant progress with the introduction of models
such as ELMo [19] and BERT [5]. These models have obtained re-
markable results in tasks like Named Entity Recognition, Sentence
Similarity andMulti-label Classification. A natural choice, therefore,
is to apply these models to biomedical NLP. Despite the impressive
results achieved by the NLP models mentioned above, previous
work has tested these models robustness by using adversarial at-
tacks, showing that they are fragile under certain test conditions.
This procedure consists of applying intentional perturbations to
the input sentences and test whether they confuse a model into
making wrong predictions or not. This methodology has shown
that models are still weak and have limited ability to generalize or
to understand the tasks they are dealing with [2, 3, 12, 16]. More-
over, in the domain of automated medical decision making, the
robustness of the models being used is even more critical as they
may impact on the well-being of patients [9].
In this work, we focus on the BERT language model to carry out
an adversarial evaluation on two BioMedical text mining tasks. On
the one hand, Named Entity Recognition (NER) which consists in
finding the relation between medical entities in text. On the other
hand, semantic textual similarity (STS), that consists in deciding if
two biomedical sentences are semantically related.
The evaluation of the NER task was performed on the BC5CDR-
disease and BC5CDR-chemical datasets [25]. In the case of STS, we
used the BioSSES dataset [22]. In this paper, we contribute by:
• Testing the strength of pre-trained BERT for medical tasks
under the scheme of adversarial attacks.
• Demonstrating that the use of the proposed adversarial exam-
ples during training can increase the robustness of the model.
2 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Previous work on adversarial examples has demonstrated how dan-
gerous it can be to use machine learning systems in real-world
applications [7, 23]. This evaluation strategy showed that slight
disturbances in the inputs could cause severe failures in deep neural
networks. Early work proposed methodologies to generate adverse
examples in order to evaluate computer vision models [1]. As a
result, it was demonstrated the weakness of the systems and propos-
ing a defense mechanism through adversarial training [7].
Perturbation methods developed for images cannot be directly ap-
plied to texts in most cases. Because of this, recent work has ex-
plored new adversarial strategies specially designed for NLP tasks
[26]. The evaluation of NLP models has been carried out mainly in
trained models for a single task [3, 16]. More recently, due to the
success of pre-trained models based on recurrent and transformer-
based networks, adversarial attacks have been applied to several
NLP benchmarks [2, 12].
Models used in the medical tasks have noticed particular interest
because an erroneous prediction could be very harmful to a patient.
Most of the proposed adversarial attacks for the medical tasks are
related to image analysis [6, 15]. Despite the existence of deployed
systems in real-world clinical settings, researchers have shown
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Table 1: Adversarial Evaluation Sentence Examples
Original Two mothers with heart valve prosthesis were treated with warfarin during pregnancy.
Swap Noise Two mothers with herat vavle protshesis were terated with warafrin during preganncy.
Keyboard Typo Noise Two mothers with hea5t valce prosth3sis were trezted with warfsrin during pregnahcy.
Synonymy Two mothers with heart valve prosthesis were treated with potassium warfarin during pregnancy.
that even the state of the art models in medical computer vision
is vulnerable to adversarial attacks. For this reason, the use of this
type of methodology has been encouraged for the evaluation and
improvement of models to avoid critical errors in these scenarios.
There is a growing availability of resources for biomedical NLP
tasks, which are mainly resolved through the use of pre-trained
models [18]. However, as far as we know, no work evaluates such
models under adversarial attacks. For that reason, in this paper, we
focus on assessing the state of the art BioNLP models robustness
and study how to strengthen them through adversarial training.
3 BIOMEDICINE TEXT MINING TASKS
We chose two tasks from the recently introduced BLUE benchmark
[18]. Not all medical resources are made public, so we decided
to focus only on the tasks that have publicly accessible datasets
(BCD5CDR-Chemical, BC5CDR-Disease, and BioSSES)1.
Named Entity Recognition. NER is a subtask of information ex-
traction that seeks to locate named entities in text and classify
them into pre-defined medical categories, such as protein, cell type,
chemical, disease, and so forth.
For this task, we use the BC5CDR dataset [25], which consists
of 1500 PubMed articles with 4409 annotated chemicals and 5818
diseases. They were selected from the CTD-Pfizer corpus that was
used in the BioCreative V chemical-disease relation task.
Given each word in a sentence, the goal of the model is to predict
its labels, following the IOB (Inside-outside-beginning) format. We
use the two variations of the dataset, one related to diseases and
the other to chemical components.
Semantic Textual Similarity. STS measures the degree of equiva-
lence in the underlying semantics of paired snippets of text. The task
is to predict the similarity score between two medical sentences.
We use the BioSSES2 dataset [22], which is a corpus of sentence pairs
selected from the Biomedical Summarization Track. The objective
of BioSSES is to compute the similarity of biomedical sentences
by utilizing WordNet as a general domain ontology and Unified
Medical Language System (UMLS) as biomedical domain-specific
ontology. The main task is to estimate a similarity score between
sentence pairs that have been manually validated by physicians.
4 BIOMEDICAL LM & ADVERSARIAL
EVALUATION
Biomedical Language Models. For this test, we focus on a pre-trained
BERT model because it is well known for its outstanding perfor-
mance in several domains of NLP. Recent BioNLP community efforts
allowed the specialization of this type of models by training on a
large medical corpus [18]. In order to use this model for the selected
tasks, we follow the fine-tuning procedure and evaluation metrics
proposed on the BLUE benchmark [18]. We compare the results of
1https://biocreative.bioinformatics.udel.edu/tasks/biocreative-v/track-3-cdr/
2https://tabilab.cmpe.boun.edu.tr/BIOSSES/
BERT pre-trained on PubMed abstracts with the same model but
pre-trained on PubMed and MIMIC-III datasets.
4.1 Adversarial Evaluation
For this evaluation, we propose a black-box attack methodology,
which does not require the inner details of the model to generate ad-
verse examples [26]. Specifically, we focus on making disturbances
in the input data, also known as edit adversaries, that could cause
the models to fall into erroneous predictions. The following subsec-
tions describe each of the adversarial sets, and their construction3.
Also, we show examples of the adversarial attacks in Table 1.
Noise Adversaries. This evaluation aims to test the robustness of
models to spelling errors. Misspelling is not usual in medical re-
sources; however, it is possible to come across it [14, 20]. Motivated
by the above and inspired by [3], we constructed adversarial exam-
ples that try to emulate spelling errors committed by human beings.
We use spaCy models [17] for processing texts of the datasets to
retrieve the medical terms of each sentence. Then, each term is re-
placed by a noisy word. These edit adversaries consist of two types
of alterations: (i) Swap Noise: For each word, one random pair of
consecutive characters is swapped, (ii)Keyboard Typo Noise: For
each word, one character is replaced by an adjacent character in
traditional English keyboards.
Synonymy Adversaries. These examples test if a model can un-
derstand synonymy relations. Replacing a medical term with an
equivalent synonym is challenging. For that reason, we focus only
on words of chemicals and diseases.
We use spaCy models to identify chemical and disease entities
of sentences. Then we use PyMedTermino [10], which uses the
biomedical vocabulary of UMLS, to find the most similar or related
words (synonyms) to the retrieved words. Finally, we replace the
synonym found depending on whether it is a disease or chemical.
5 EXPERIMENTS
Experimental Setup. We use two BERT-base models pre-trained
on PubMed (P) or PubMed and MIMIC-III (P+M) datasets [18]. We
fine-tune the models with the original train sets of each task and
evaluate them with the original set test and the adversarial sets.
In terms of metrics, since NER is a classification task, we measure
the F1 score. However, for STS experiments, we evaluate similarity
by using Pearson correlation coefficients.
Results on Adversarial Evaluation for the NER Task. Table 2
shows the classification results of the BC5CDR task on our adversar-
ial examples and the original test set. We see that the performance
of BERT drops across all adversarial attacks. However, the task of
recognizing the disease was the most affected.
In the case of the chemical recognition task (Figure 1a), both BERT
versions show a drop of approximately 20% of the F1 score. In
3Adversarial dataset will be available after notification
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Table 2: Adversarial evaluation in the NER task.
Train Set Model Test Set Precision Recall F1
BC5CDR-
Chemical
Original .894 .893 .894
BERT Synonym .744 .739 .741
P+M Keyboard .619 .541 .578
Swap .764 .698 .728
Original .895 .908 .901
BERT Synonym .730 .748 .739
P Keyboard .734 .683 .708
Swap .609 .559 .583
BC5CDR-
Disease
Original .828 .829 .828
BERT Synonym .322 .371 .345
P+M Keyboard .528 .273 .360
Swap .636 .369 .467
Original .832 .844 .838
BERT Synonym .337 .390 .362
P Keyboard .543 .278 .368
Swap .636 .337 .441
Figure 1: Adversarial evaluation in the NER task.
(a) BC5CDR-Chemical
(b) BC5CDR-Disease
general, the drop in the model is slight, which could be because
the number of annotated chemicals is smaller than the number of
annotated diseases.
In contrast, the F1 score of the disease recognition model (Figure 1b)
falls dramatically, below 50% of the original score. As we mentioned
above, the disease set contains more annotations. For this reason, its
adversarial dataset becomes harder as noise adversaries are applied
to all the annotations. If there are more diseases present in the
dataset, the model will be exposed to more adversarial attacks.
Comparing the performance of BERT (P+M) with BERT (P), on the
original test set they achieve similar F1 scores. Then when adding
keyboard noise, BERT P is less affected than BERT P+M. In the
case of synonym noise, it affects both models in similar proportions.
Finally, when adding swap noise, the effect is contrary, BERT P+M is
Table 3: Stress Semantic Textual Similarity Task tests results using
adversarial test set.
Train Set Model Test Set Pearson Spearman
BioSSES
Original .832 .744
BERT Synonym .844 .774
P+M Keyboard .656 .656
Swap .622 .685
BioSSES
Original .829 .813
BERT Synonym .869 .666
P Keyboard .759 .607
Swap .765 .774
Table 4: Adversarial evaluation in the BC5CDR-Chemical NER task
after adversarial training.
Model Train Test precision recall f1
BERT
P+M
Synonym Original .888 .886 .887Synonym .863 .898 .880
Keyboard Original .892 .890 .891Keyboard .834 .810 .822
Swap Original .886 .889 .888Swap .668 .610 .638
BERT
P
Synonym Original .899 .901 .900Synonym .872 .908 .890
Keyboard Original .889 .906 .898Keyboard .850 .792 .820
Swap Original .895 .902 .898Swap .684 .630 .656
less affected than BERT P. This pattern is observed in both Chemical
and Disease NER datasets.
Results on Adversarial Evaluation for the STS Task. Table 3
shows the results of the STS task tested in the BioSSES dataset.
We see that the Pearson coefficient of the model drops about 23%
(P+M) and 8% (P) under adversarial noise attacks. However, the
results of synonymy adversaries show a different response for both
models. This task comprises two sentences, but we modify only one
of them. We hypothesize that words replaced by their synonyms in
one sentence tend to be the same or more similar to the other sen-
tence. It would explain why the Pearson coefficient with synonymy
adversaries is higher than with the original test set.
Adversarial Training Results. Training with adversarial exam-
ples is a methodology used in previous works [3, 11] to create
robustness in neural language models. It ensures that the model is
exposed to samples outside the training distribution and provides a
form of regularization [3].
For both tasks, we first fine-tune the model with the original train-
ing set plus an adversarial version of the same set. Then we carry
out the same procedure explained in Section 4.1, to measure how
the models perform in the different test sets.
On the one hand, Table 4 and Table 5 show the results for NER of
training with adversaries and testing with the original set compared
with their respective adversaries.
On the other hand, Table 6 we train for the STS taskwith adversaries
and testing with different test sets.
In both cases, we see that training with adversarial examples sig-
nificantly improves robustness of the models to adversarial attacks,
without significant impact on the original non-adversarial task.
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Table 5: Adversarial evaluation in the BC5CDR-Disease NER task
after adversarial training.
Model Train Test precision recall f1
BERT
P+M
Synonym Original .805 .806 .805Synonym .786 .832 .808
Keyboard Original .830 .839 .835Keyboard .711 .698 .704
Swap Original .826 .831 .828Swap .745 .736 .741
BERT
P
Synonym Original .813 .824 .818Synonym .788 .841 .814
Keyboard Original .839 .848 .844Keyboard .723 .712 .717
Swap Original .836 .847 .841Swap .773 .746 .759
Table 6: Adversarial evaluation in the STS task after adversarial
training.
Model Train Test Pearson Spearman
BERT
P+M
Synonym Original .723 .607Synonym .742 .557
Keyboard Original .741 .626Keyboard .676 .538
Swap Original .615 .557Swap .528 .508
BERT
P
Synonym Original .790 .518Synonym .796 .705
Keyboard Original .827 .715Keyboard .789 .607
Swap Original .566 .734Swap .775 .774
6 CONCLUSIONS
By observing previous results obtained by state-of-the-art language
models, the NER and STS tasks seemed close to being solved. How-
ever, when applying adversaries, we realize the need for adversarial
evaluation and training to ensure the strength of the models.
We noted that a relevant factor is the content used to train the
BERT language model. Theoretically, a more extensive vocabulary
would give the model a higher capability to generalize for new
cases. However, we observed the opposite: in most of the cases,
training only with PubMed allowed the model to be more prepared
to adversarial attacks than when pre-trained with PubMed and
MIMIC-III.
Unexpected behaviors were observed when replacingmedical terms
with synonyms in the STS task. Adversarial synonym tests sur-
passed the original results. We hypothesize that it might be because
the adversaries introduced by us in some cases brought together
terms that in the original dataset were further apart.
For future work, we plan to explore other medicine-related tasks,
such as document-screening or multi-label classification.
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